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THE American state has developed two of its institutions to a
degree never before attained-the capitalist form of business enter-
prise and the judicial power. At first sight the combination seems
paradoxical, joining in a single pattern an exploitative type of eco-
nomic behavior with the objectivity of the judicial process. But
those who have studied the building of the American state know
that the paradox lies only on the surface. It is no historical acci-
dent but a matter of cultural logic that a Field should grow where
a Morgan does; and a Brandeis is none the less organic a product
of capitalist society than is a Debs. If the contrast between the
first pair and the second is precipitous, it is none the less contrast
and not contradiction. Between our business enterprise and our
judicial power there is the unity of an aggressive and cohesive cul-
tural pattern. They seem of the same fibre; have, both of them,
the same toughness, richness, extravagant growth; hold out at once
portent and promise.
Capitalist business enterprise, while it has reached its most con-
summate form in the United States,' is generic to the whole western
world. But the judicial power-or more exactly, judicial supremacy
-is a uniquely American institution: 2 it could arise only in a federal
state which attempts, as we do, to drive a wedge of constitutional
uniformity through heterogeneous sectional and economic groupings.
The core of judicial supremacy is of course the power of judicial
review of legislative acts and administrative decisions.8 And the
t Managing Editor of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. See the author's
The Social Thought of Mr. Justice Brandeis (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 1.
The substance of this article was presented in briefer form in a paper read
before the American Political Science Association, in Detroit, December, 1932.
1. An analysis of the course of American capitalism is included in section III,
infra.
2. There have perhaps been states in the past more completely under the
judicial sway than America. But that the rule of judges through their veto power
over legislation is the unique American contribution to the science of government
has become a truism of political thought.
3. The literature on judicial review is extensive and polemical. E. S. Con-
wiN, THE DOCTRINE OF JuDIciAL Rzvmw (1914) is still unsurpassed for the his-
tory of the doctrine and his article on Judicial Review (1932) 8 ENOYCLOPin-DIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCEs 457, is at once sane and penetrating. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDIcARy (1932), in the course of a vigorous attack on the institution, pro-
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exercise of that power by the United States Supreme Court has
made it not only "the world's most powerful court" 4 but the focal
point of our bitterest political and constitutional polemics.
At the heart of these polemics is the recognition that the real
meaning of the Court is to be found in the political rather than
the legal realm, and that its concern is more significantly with power
politics than with judicial technology. The Court itself of course,
in its official theory of its own function, disclaims any relation to
the province of government or the formation of public policy: it
pictures itself as going about quietly applying permanent canons
of interpretation to the settlement of individual disputes. If there
is any truth in this position the Court's quietness must be regarded
as that of the quiet spot in the center of a tornado. However serene
it may be or may pretend to be in itself, the Court is the focal point
of a set of dynamic forces which play havoc with the landmarks of
the American state and determine the power configuration of the
day. Whatever may be true of the function of private law as re-
stricting itself to the settlement of disputes and the channeling of
conduct in society, public law in a constitutional state operates to
shift or stabilize the balance of social power.
There has been a tendency in some quarters to regard the power
function of the Court as the result of an imperialistic expansion
by which the justices have pushed their way to a "place in the
sun.' 5 We still think in the shadow of AMontesquieu and view the
political process as an equation in governmental powers. The
growth of the Court's power has, by this conception, taken place
at the expense of the legislative and executive departments, and
the American state has become the slave of a judicial oligarchy.
The literature in which this enslavement is traced and expounded
is voluminous, polemical and, even when very able, somewhat dull.
It is dull with the dullness of a thin and mechanical lcitmotiv-the
theory of usurpation, of the deliberate annexation by the Court of
powers never intended for it. This theory is part of the general
philosophy of political equilibrium which, originating with the
eighteenth century philosophes, was reinforced by nineteenth cen-
tury physics. It holds that the safety of the individual can be
assured only by maintaining a balance between the departments
of the state. Whatever may have been the validity of such a phil-
sents a valuable although overaccented examination of the sequence of Supreme
Court decisions from the standpoint of the development of the judicial power.
4. The phrase is that of Felix Frankfurter, "Mr. Justice Brandeis and the
Constitution," in Frankfurter, ed., Lim JUSTICE BRANs ms (1932) at 125; but the
appraisal represented is a general one.
5. For the most recent and most powerful development of this theme, see
BounDiN, op. cit. supra note 3.
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osophy in a pre-industrial age, it has become archaic in a period
when government is itself dwarfed by the new economic forces. It
is as if generals in a besieged city should quarrel over precedence
while the enemy was thundering at the gates.
There was, let it be admitted, a period in which the problem of
judicial usurpation was a lively issue. Readers of Beveridge's vol-
umes on Marshall " are struck by the bitter political tone of the
early years of the Court, beginning even with its decision in Chis-
holm v. Georgia.7 Charge and countercharge, invective and recrim-
ination were staple, and in the din of party conflict it was no wonder
that the still small voice of judicial objectivity was often completely
drowned. In such an atmosphere usurpation had meaning and
utility. The polity was in its formative stage, and there was little
about the constitutional structure that was irrevocably settled. The
Revolution had hewn out a new world but, as we who have been
contemporaries of another Revolution can well understand, the task
of giving that world content and precision of outline still remained.
In the jockeying for political position and the general scramble for
advantage, every argument counted, and much of the political theory
of the day can be best understood in terms of this orientation toward
the distribution of power. But what counted even more than theory
was the fait accompli. Every new governmental step was decisive
for later power configurations, and might some day be used as
precedent. And the battles of the giants, Marshall's battles with
Jefferson and Jackson, were the battles of men who knew how to
use the fait accompli.
The Court has then from the very beginning been part of the
power-structure of the state, acting as an interested arbiter of
disputes between the branches of the government and between the
states and the federal government, and with an increasingly magis-
tral air distributing the governmental powers. But to a great extent
the significant social struggles of the first half-century of the new
state were waged outside the Court. Each period has its charac-
acteristic clashes of interests and its characteristic battlegrounds
where those clashes occur. In the pre-industrial period the party
formations measured with a rough adequacy the vital sectional,
economic and class differences in the country. The party battles
of the period had some meaning, and accumulated stresses could
6. THE Lwm OF JoHN MARSHnAL (1916-20). This was of course duo to some
extent to the general bitterness of party polemics in a period of political realities.
See also WARRm, THE SuPRmiin COURT IN UNITED STATES HIS.TORY (1922) for a
vivid depiction of a similar effect. Both Beveridge and Warren drew copiously
upon newspaper material.
7. 2 Dall. 419 (U. S. 1793).
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find release through changes of party power. The function of the
Supreme Court in this scheme lay rather in settling the lines of
the polity than in resolving disputes that could not be resolved out-
side. But when party formations grew increasingly blurred and
issues like slavery and industrialism arose to cut across party lines,
an attempt was made, *notably in the Dred Scott case, to draw the
Supreme Court into the struggle over social policy. The attempt
was of course disastrofts, for the slavery issue reached too deep to
the economic and emotional foundations of the life of the day to
be resolved by a counting of heads of more or less partisan judges.
It is significant that the most direct effect of the Dred Scott decision
was the sudden growth to power of a new political party, which
should settle the basic question of public policy in the approved man-
ner at the polls. The subsequent resort to war revealed that there
might be some issues so basic that they could not be settled at all
within the constitutional framework.
The coming of industrialism cut clear across the orientation and
function of the Court as it cut across every other phase of American
life. The doctrine of judicial review, whatever may have been its
precedents and whatever the legalisms of its growth, had become
by the middle of the century an integral part of the American
political system. But it was not the dominant political institution,
nor had it acquired the compelling incidence upon public policy that
it has today. Before that could happen there had to be such a shift
in the nature of the state that the characteristic clashes of interest
would be taken out of the sphere of democratic control. In short
only through the building of an extra-democratic structure of reality
upon the framework of a democratic theory could the judicial power
be given' a real vitality or the Supreme Court attain its present
towering command over the decision of public policy.
That transformation was effected by the maturing of capitalism
with its strange combination of individualism as a pattern of belief
and the corporation as a pattern of control. Business enterprise
furnished the setting within which the Court was to operate, and
in this setting the ramifications of the problems that came up for
solution effected a complete change in the meaning and function
of the judicial power. That power had always, when exercised, had
far-reaching effects upon the process of our national life; even when
in abeyance it had been a force to be reckoned with. The Court
by expounding and applying the written Constitution had always
constituted one of the elements that determined the shape and direc-
tion of the real constitution-the operative controls of our society.
But the real Constitution became under capitalism merely the modus
operandi of business enterprise. Between it on the one hand, and
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on the other the ideals of the American experiment and the phrases
in which the eighteenth century had clothed those ideals, there was
an ever lengthening gulf: it became the function of the Supreme
Court to bridge that gulf. Capitalist enterprise in America gener-
ated, as capitalism has everywhere generated, forces in government
,and in the underlying classes hostile to capitalistic expansion and
bent upon curbing it: it became the function of the Court to check
those forces and to lay down the lines of economic orthodoxy. For
the effective performance of its purposes capitalist enterprise re-
quires legal certainty amidst the flux of modern life,8 legal uni-
formity amidst the heterogeneous conditions and opinions of a vast
sprawling country, the legal vesting of interests amidst the swift
changes of a technological society: to furnish it with these was the
huge task which the Supreme Court had successfully to perform.
The Court had of course other functions, and may be regarded from
other angles. But if we seek a single and consistent body of prin-
ciples which will furnish the rationale of the judicial power in the
last half century, we must find in it the dynamics of American
business enterprise.
II
The steady growth in the judicial power and the increasing evi-
dences of its economic affiliations have made the Court one of the
great American ogres, part of the demonology of liberal and radical
thought.9 It has served, in fact, as something of a testing-ground
for political attitudes of every complexion. The Marxist, making
the whole of politics merely an addendum to capitalism, sees the
Court as the tool and capitalism as the primary force. The con-
temporary Jeffersonian, fearful of all centralizing power and zealous
for the liberties of the common man, fears Wall Street and the
Supreme Court alternately, uncertain as to which is the shadow
and which the substance. His cousin the liberal, if he is of a con-
structive turn, counts on using the machinery of the Court to control
in a statesmanlike fashion a developing capitalism which it is futile
8. It is generally accepted that one of the essential elements of law is cer-
tainty, and that it is especially essential for the development of capitalism. It
encourages accumulation and investment by certifying the stability of the con-
tractual relations. But it is to be conjectured that a speculative period In capi-
talist development thrives equally or better on uncertainty in the law. And in
periods of economic collapse the crystallized certainty of capitalist law acts as
an element of inflexibility in delaying adjustments to new conditions.
9. In America the liberals have been extremely critical of the power of judi-
cial review. In Germany, however, on the question of introducing it, the liberals
supported it while the conservative parties opposed it. See C. J. Friedrich, Tho
Issue of Judicial Review in Germany (1928) 43 POL. ScI. Q. 188.
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to turn back; or, if he has lost faith in the efficacy of tinkering with
governmental machinery and has become an ethical liberal, he re-
fuses to regard either Big Business or the Supreme Court in them-
selves important, but looks to the quality of the American experience
that flows through them both. The technological liberal, who thinks
in blueprints and plans for state planning, regards the Court as
the great technical obstruction that his plans must meet, and racks
his brain for ingenious ways of avoiding the encounter.
The contemporary indictment of the Court, which furnishes the
point of departure for all these shades of opinion, is in the large
well known. It holds that the Court's decisions can be better ex-
plained by economic bias than by judicial objectivity, and that its
trend has been to bolster the status quo. This indictment is itself
of course far from objective. It is the expression of an attitude.
And that attitude can be best studied in relation to its genesis in
the Progressive movement, which ran its brief course between the
turn of the twentieth century and the American entrance into the
war. To that movement may be traced the current "economic in-
terpretation" of the Court, which links its decisions with the growth
of capitalism. The Mlarxists might of course claim this approach
as deriving from their own "materialist" conception, diluted or vul-
garized in the course of its transmission to our shores. But whatever
the degree of logical identity with Marxist materialism, in its actual
historical growth the economic interpretation of the Supreme Court
is a native product. It was out of the characteristic social conflicts
of the Progressive period that the economic approach to the Court
emerged, and from the intellectual dilemmas of the period that it
received its formulation. In fact, if one still detects in the attitude
of liberal critics of the court an equivocal and confused note, it may
be found not wholly alien to the irresoluteness, the divided sense of
hostility and acceptance that lay at the heart of the Progressive
movement.
The Progressive period was one of great ferment in thought and
gallantry in action.10 A peculiar emotional intensity surrounded the
public life. From the western plains the storm of agrarian Populism
had already broken, in the form of state granger legislation, an
Interstate Commerce Act, and all manner of heterodox currency
proposals. The trust-busting offensive, which had opened with the
10. JOHN CHAmBERLAIN, FAREWELL To REFORM! (1932) gives a brilliant sur-
vey of "the rise, life and decay of the Progressive mind." 3 PAUNGTON, MAIN
CumRN IN AtnmIcAw THouGrHT (1930), left incomplete by the author's death,
throws out a few suggestive leads, especially in the Introduction and the last
chapter. HAcIEA AND KENnRicK, THE UNrrnE STATES SINCE 1865 (1932) gives
an excellent account of the period.
1933]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Sherman Act, and had startled Wall Street in Roosevelt's drive
against the Northern Securities combine, was moving on to the
scrutiny of the Money Trust in the Pujo investigation. In the cities
the muckrakers were canvassing the tie-up between political cor-
ruption and the "Interests," " and more solidly the labor movement
was closing up its phalanxes and pressing for social legislation.
Intellectually there was a prevailing malaise. The confidence in the
national destiny was slipping, as was the faith in the adequacy of
the democratic structure. Not since the days of Emerson and John
Brown had Americans been forced thus to search their hearts and
inquire into the direction of the national drift. The answer of the
activists was the liberal revolt in politics against the increasing
entrenchment of the illiberal forces. To that revolt the political
thinkers made a definite contribution.' 2 Probing the principles
underlying the American venture they dug beneath the political
ideals to their economic basis. They emerged with the discovery
that the tie-up with the economic "Interests" applied not only to
current politics but to the very fabric of the state; that the august
Supreme Court and the still more august Constitution 18 which it
expounded and guarded were not, as had been supposed, detached
and self-contained; and that between them and the realities of the
marketplace there was an unlovely traffic.
This discovery was made not, as the muckrakers and the populists
had discovered Corruption and the Interests, through a journalistic
foray into contemporary reality, but through a vast historical re-
search. The revaluation of American democracy was pushed back
to the Founding Fathers themselves, and with explosive results.1 4
11. C. C. REGIER, THE ERA or THE MUCKRAKERS (1932) gives a detailed ac-
count of this movement.
12. For an interesting analysis of this contribution and the intellectual situa-
tion which evoked it, see PARRINGTON, THE BEGINNINGS OF CRITICAL RAhLISI I IN
AMERICA (1930) Introductory chapter, xxiii-xxix, and "A Chapter on American
Liberalism" at 401-413. Much of the same ground is covered in Parrington's In-
troduction to J. ALLEN SMITH, THE GROWTH AND DECADENCE Or CONSTITuTIONAL
GOVERNMENT (1930). "Considered historically," he says of the progressive think-
ers, "their main contribution was the discovery of the undemocratic nature of the
Federal constitution."
13. For an account of the hold of Constitution-worship on the American mind,
see Hamilton, Constitutionalism (1931) 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
255.
14. It should be noted that some of the Fathers themselves were attracted by
the idea of economic determination. This is especially true of Madison, whose
realistic awareness of the relation between economic interest and political action
was striking. See BEARD, ECONOMIC BASIS OF POLITICS (1922). In fact it may
be said that the contact with Madison's thought became an element which has
strengthened the hold of economic determinism in American thought.
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To be sure, the dynamite was already at hand, in the temper and
intellectual equipment of the period. The "vague terror" which
"went over the earth" when "the word Socialism began to be
heard" X'5 at about this time had to some extent been felt as far
away from German Mlarxism as were the American Centers of aca-
demic thought, and the class struggle as well as the materialist
interpretation of history were not unheard of. Veblen in 1904 had
shown in a chapter 6 of his Theory of Busminess Enterprise that the
business influence extended to American law through a carry-over
of the eighteenth century natural rights philosophy in the interests
of Big Business. Even Turner's theory of a moving frontier, ex-
pounded as early as 1893,17 had suggested how important might
be the economic base of political attitudes. But these stray leads
of scholarship counted for less than did the felt realities of the
day. The air was filled with the clash of group and class economic
interests: what easier than to project this clash back to the found-
ing of the Republic?
This was exactly what J. Allen Smith did in 1907 in his The
Spirit of American Government."' It was not a great book, as
Veblen's books are great or Turner's essay. There was no titanic
outpouring of social analysis in it, no brilliant and clean-cut theory.
But it was a courageous book and a dogged one. It hung on to its
thesis that the American state had been shaped in its growth by
conflicts of interest that were at bottom economic. Smith was fol-
lowed and buttressed by 'Charles Beard. In his Economic Inter-
pretation of the Constitution (1913)-a title which in itself bore
witness that a new Higher Criticism had been born-Beard's search
of treasury records, convention debates and contemporary journals
turned up formidable evidence to the effect that the Constitution
was an "economic document" and had been railroaded through by
the property interests of the time who stood to gain by it.IO The
15. HOLmES, CoLLEcTED LEGAL PAPErS (1920) at 295.
16. C. viii, "Business Principles in Law and Politics".
17. "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," reprinted in
TURNER, FRONT=E iN AmERICA= HISTORY (1921). CHAtBERLuIN, op. cit. supra
note 10, has an interesting analysis of the relation of Turner's thesis to the Pro-
gressive movement.
18. For estimates of the place of this book in the thought of its day, see
Parrington's Introduction to StIrrH, op. cit. supra note 12; and Walton Hamil-
ton's review of it (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 152.
19. Beard analyzed the "personality interests" as "money, public securities,
manufactures, and trade and shipping." BnAm. EcoNoniic INTERPflDTATIor OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1913) at 324. See also chapter V, "The Economic Interests
of the Members of the Convention." His last chapter contains a clear and force-
ful statement of his theses, which have the uncompromising ring of Luther's and
were doubtless intended to be nailed up on all the academic doors of the day. See
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reverberations of these books were considerable,20 but whatever the
anathema or discipleship that they stirred up, the venture in his-
torical research had done its work. Through the attack on the
Constitution a flank attack had been delivered on the Supreme
Court.
But the analysis was now extended further, by a host of scholars
and publicists.21  It was not enough to show that the Constitution
which the Court expounded had not the stainless objectivity which
was claimed for it: the charge was now made that whatever the
origins of the Constitution, the Court was not really expounding it
but that the justices were reading their own class interests into it.
Granted the validity of the historical thesis of Smith and Beard
this was indeed a logical consequence, for it was not to be supposed
that a process operative in the creation of the Constitution should
cease to be operative in its interpretation. Bentley's Process of
Government (1908), which made an impression on the scholars of
the day, had shown government not as a formal structure but as
a dynamic process twisted and turned in various directions under
the pressure of group interests. This theory of pressures Bentley
had applied to the judicial process as well, and it fitted in with the
prevailing pluralist attack on nineteenth century Austinianism and
the new emphasis given to the reality of economic groupings.22 The
result was a general assumption among the students of the Court
that the decisions of the justices could be explained by their economic
-interests and sympathies-an assumption which rarely went as far
as Gustavus Myers did in his uncompromising History of the Su-
preme Court (1912), but was often present as a preconception Pven
where it was not avowed. Most of the discussion in the years im-
mediately preceding the war was concentrated on judicial review.2 3
for a similar analysis of the first decade of the new state, BEAuD, ECoNo1H0
ORIGrNs or JEFFERSONuN DEmocRAcy (1915) especially chapter VI, "Security-
Holding and Politics."
20. It is perhaps not without significance that this period represented the im.
pressionable intellectual years of the present generation of American constitu-
tional scholars.
21. Much of the literature about the judicial power appeared in the decade
after publication of Smith's book, and the writers (Beard, Goodnow, Corwin,
McLaughlin, Hadley, Farrand, Boudin, Davis, Haines, Weyl, Warren and others)
used as their point of departure, on one side or the other, the thesis of economic
interest.
22. The fusion of these two strains-pluralism and the emphasis on economic
realities-in the political thought at the beginning of the war is illustrated in
Charles Beard's survey of tendencies, Political Science in the Crucible (1917) 13
Nuw RETUBLIc, Nov. 17, part II, 3.
23. The discussion of judicial review of course dates back in a sense to the be-
ginning of the Court's work. In its intense form it may be traced back to the
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Its incidence and its historical validity were hotly debated, and the
issue was even projected into the political campaigns in the form
of proposals to strip the Court of its power, or at least determine
the conditions under which the power could be exercised.24
We can see now that this entire Progressive critique of the con-
nection of the Court with capitalism was itself a phase of capitalist
development. It came at the crucial turn in the history of American
business when it began to be clear that the system of controls set up
by a democratic pre-industrial society were futile under the new
conditions of life, and it marked the awakening of the middle class
to that fact. Little Business felt itself being crowded out by Big
Business, and for a brief moment the farmers, the traders, the
unions, and the small bourgeoisie huddled together to check its
further career. But as Walton Hamilton has put it, "their best
wisdom was the product of a social experience that was passing." 25
Their anti-trust legislation, armed to cope with a situation produced
by an exhausted individualism, continued to use the technique of
that same individualism. When even that technique was burked
by the decisions of the Court, and when more positive attempts at
social legislation and government control met with an equal fate,20
the relation between the Court and Big Business took on an un-
mistakeable clarity for the thinkers who expressed the world of
little business.
Perhaps too great a clarity. The intellectual phase of the Pro-
gressive movement suffered from the populist tendency of the period
toward the personal identification of villainy. Myers, fresh from
his investigations of the direct personal corruption of the Tammany
braves,27 and of the unscrupulous careers of some of the builders
of great American fortunes, 28 carried over the same mechanical
furore that followed the decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (U. S.
1856) and later in Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421 (1884). It was the latter
case that called forth George Bancroft's fiery pamphlet, A PLEA FOR THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WOUNDED IN THE HOUSE OF ITS GUARDIANS
(1886).
24. The issue was most clearly drawn in La Follette's program.
25. The Control of Big Business (1932) 134 NATION 591, 592.
26. The stripping of the Sherman Act of much of its significance, the crip-
pling of the Federal Trade Commission, and the attempts to qualify the powers
of the Interstate Commerce Commission are important chapters in American ad-
ministrative history. See SHAPFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COM UMCE CoMS sxoN
(1931); HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoisWSSION (1924); Myron Watkdns,
The Federal Trade Commission (1932) 32 CoL. L. REV. 272; KEEzER AND MAY,
THE PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1930); THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAwS, A
SYMPOSrUM (1932).
27. THE HISTORY OF TAmmAN HALT (1901).
28. HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES (1910).
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approach to the very different sphere of the judicial process,20 and
tried to show how a reactionary majority opinion might rest on the
stock-holdings of the justice who had written it, or on his previous
associations as a corporation lawyer. Beard too, on his mettle
perhaps against academic hostility, tried to prove more than he
had to; and while his investigations into the direct "personality
interests" of the framers of the Constitution are a tour de force of
historical research, the very concreteness of his approach did much
to pave the way for a too mechanical economic interpretation of the
Court. The search has been throughout for light on direct pres-
sures and the personal motives of the judges. Even those who are
averse to the economic interpretation tend to resolve the whole
problem of the judicial process to a matter of personal judicial
whim. How unfruitful both these approaches are-the mechanical
economic interpretation and the atomistic personal interpretation
-I hope to show in the last section of this paper. But before that
it will be necessary to inquire to what extent a developing American
capitalism did represent an impinging force upon the Court, and
how the Court - as a whole and through its various ideological
groups - reacted to that impact.
III
In itself capitalism is merely the name we give to a system of
free individualist enterprise which allows and forifies the accu-
mulation of wealth.30 It is thus in essence a scheme of economic
organization going back to the beginning of modern times and rest-
ing upon legal institutions, the most important of which are private
property and contract. Within these limits capitalism has more
recently developed on the one hand a set of technological methods and
on the other a set of working rules 31 which we call respectively in-
dustrialism and business. Both these lines of growth have wrought
vast changes in the character of capitalist society. Industrialism
in production has brought the factory, the machine process, the
29. HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1912).
30. In addition to Marx's classic analysis of capitalism, see SOMBART, Dim
MODERNE KAPITALISMUS (4th ed. 1921-27), and DER BOURGOIS, Eng trans., (The
quintessence of capitalism, 1915); HOBSON, THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN CAPITAL-
ismi (1926 ed.); and the writings of Thorstein Veblen, especially THE THEORY or
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1923), and ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP (1923). The point of
departure for Veblen's work is the form that capitalism has taken in America.
The emphasis of the present article is therefore rather on the Veblenian analysis
than on the Marxist.
31. I take the phrase "working rules" from the suggestive analysis In Cof-
moNS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924).
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large city and the working class, and has given our world the char-
acteristic outer stamp that it bears. Business enterprise has brought
the corporation, the credit structure, the investment banker and
the marketing mechanism, and has given our world its inner living
spirit.32 In both realms the working rules have changed so rapidly
and with such fateful consequence as to merit the designation of
"revolution." 33 But these revolutions, however drastic, have not
shattered the outlines of the capitalist system. They have merely
realized its inherent trends and possibilities.
It is obvious that the large movements of modern law can be
understood best in relation to this development of a capitalist so-
ciety. The ways of life and the property attitudes of this society
while it was still rural and bourgeois have written themselves into
the Anglo-American common law. They have written themselves
also into American constitutional law, as embodied first in the writ-
ten document drawn up by a group of "men of substance" acting
as spokesmen for the more or less property-conscious American
society of the late eighteenth century, and as interpreted by a
property-conscious Supreme Court. In all societies the historical
function of law has been to elaborate, rationalize and protect the
dominant institutions and the accredited ways of life, and the func-
tion of public law has been to apply ultimately the coercion of the
state toward maintaining the outlines of those dominant institu-
tions.34 American constitutional law, whatever may be its unique
modes of operation and principles of growth, is not exempt from
this function.
But here as everywhere the large historical generalization
conceals great dangers. To say that American constitutional law
rationalizes and gives sanction to American capitalist society is of
little value unless the relation between the two is traced historically
32. It is in this contrast between the matter-of-factness of industrialism and
the sophisticated and devious business structure imposed upon it, that Veblen
finds the central contradiction of capitalism. See his TnEORY OF Busnmss
ENTERPnisE (1923); THE INsTINCT OF WORKLIANSHI (1914); ABsENrr OwN=I-
sinp (1923).
33. The revolution in technology has been called the Industrial Revolution;
the more recent technological developments have been called by Mcakn the "Sec-
ond Industrial Revolution"; Bmum AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) speak aptly of the drastic changes in the scale and
methods of business as the "corporate revolution."
34. Maitland's remark, that "our whole constitutional law seems at times to
be but an appendix to the law of real property" (THE CONSTrTUTIONAL HISTOrY
OF ENGLAm (1908) at 538) was probably intended mainly to express his sense
of the erratic logic of development in history. But it is significant also in show-
ing how the line of development in public law is the legal elaboration and pro-
tection of the dominant institutions-in this case property.
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and with an eye to the evolving character of each. As with all
words that have grown to be symbols and are moved about as
counters in argument, capitalism has taken on for us a singleness
of meaning that beclouds more issues than it illumines. Actually
of course it is not only an exceedingly complex institution, reaching
out into many domains of what men do and how they think, but it
is also a rapidly shifting one. Its tremendous importance for the
Supreme Court flows from this fact of its change. For to a static
capitalism, however baleful or beneficent, the Court and the nation
could eventually work out a harmonious adjustment, balancing some-
how the demands of constitutional rules with the interests of con-
stituent groups. But a changing capitalism is continually undoing
what is done even before it has been entirely done. Being a growing
thing it creates conflicts of interest, problems of control, disorders
in the "economic order" while the ink is scarce dry on the statute
or decision which attempted to heal the ravages of some previous
change. Its superior mobility over previous systems of economic
organization, such as the feudal or slave systems, derives from the
fact that it rests on a rapidly moving technological base and appeals
to the free and even reckless flow of individual energy. We have as
a consequence the characteristic transitionalism of modern western
society and that instability of institutional arrangements which
gives it its vitality. And in the United States the pace of capitalist
development has been extraordinarily rapid, abbreviating the earlier
stages- upon which the European societies lingered for centuries,
and setting the pace for the entire world in the latest stages.
The history of American capitalist development falls roughly into
four periods. With due awareness of the danger of schematism,
and with an eye especially to their impact upon the problem of legal
control, the periods may be described as (1) pre-industrial capi-
talism, (2) industrial capitalism, (3) monopoly capitalism, and (4)
finance capitalism. 5 Pre-industrial capitalism is a catch-all for the
35. Periodization in modern economic history has varied of course with tho
point of view adopted (see, for example, works by the Hammonds, Clapham,
Weber, Gras, Cunningham). Since capitalism is a Marxist concept, periodization
from the point of view of capitalist development has been attempted by the Marx-
ist writers or those deriving from them, and has been tied up intipiately with the
general development of Marxist theory. Werner Sombart's division of capitalism
into Frfihkapitalismus, Hochkapitalismus and Spdtkapitalismus. is well known.
SOMBART, op. cit. supra note 30; also Sombart's article on Capitalism (1930) 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 195. Marx's own division was between
pre-industrial capitalism, industrial capitalism and monoply capitalism. JOHN
A. HOBSON, THE EvoLUTIoN OF MODERN CAPITALISM (1894) follows similar lines.
Largely as a result of Hobson's analysis of imperialism in his book of that name,
and also as a result of HILFDING FINANZKAPITAL (1910) and the logic of events
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various phases of development lying in European history between
the commercial Revolution and the early decades of the nineteenth
century; 31 in America, between colonization and the first railroad
network in the eighteen forties. It was an economy still basically
agricultural, with a growing superstructure of trade and small man-
ufacture. In America as in Europe the juristic importance of this
period lies in its having laid the foundations for the capitalist state,
hewn out the institution of property, and fashioned the master ideas,
such as individualism and natural rights, which were to exercise so
tenacious a hold upon the modern mind.
What the pre-industrial period seems so neatly to have settled,
industrial capitalism proceeded to unsettle. In America we may
block out the four decades from the eighteen forties to the eighties
as marking the rise of an industrial society. The machine-process,- T
large-scale industry, a far-flung system of transportation and com-
munication, and an urban way of life represented the principle lines
of development. The growth of monopoly, and of a financial struc-
ture was not at all absent in this period, but it was accompaniment
rather than main theme: its possibilities, scarcely dreamt of, awaited
later phases of capitalism. The sectional distribution of industrial
development was uneven: until the Civil War it was so completely
identified with the northern states to the exclusion of the southern
that an only mildly heterodox theory of the Civil War attributes it
to this antimony rather than to a struggle over human rights.
Large stretches of the West also have remained agrarian to this
day. The main drift however toward the creation of an industrial
state meant a vast displacement of pre-industrial institutions. The
actual meaning and social incidence of property were radically
at the outbreak of the war, the Marxists, especially LENIN, THE STA.T AND Ruvo-
LUTION (1919), added another stage which they called variously and by its re-
spective aspects "imperialistic capitalism" and "finance capitalism". In Amer-
ican economic history there has been little attempt to lay out a broad analysis of
stages, other than that involved in the concept of industrialism. See for repre-
sentative classifications, FAULNER, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1924) and
KIRKAND, HISTORY OF AmumucAN ECONOiIC LIFE (1932). COMMONs, HISTORY
OF LABOR (1926), divides American developments into the custom-order period,
the merchant-capitalist or job-capitalist period, the middleman period and the
corporation period; his point of view is that of the dependence of the laborer
upon shifting entities with the extension of markets and of bargaining power
over wider areas.
36. See for a good account of the European development, J. L. AND BABARA
HAMinoND, THE RISE OF MODERN INDUSTRY (1925).
37. See VEBmLEN, op. cit. supra note 30.
38. 2 CHARLES AND MARY BEARD, THE RISE OF A=MicAN CzvuraZATxON (1927)
C. XVIII, "The Second American Revolution," which interprets the war as a
revolution of the non-industrial South against the industrial north.
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shifted. The gap between the propertied and the propertiless was
widened and given significance, and the general lines of economic
distribution and social stratification were drawn with the emergence
of a capitalist entrepreneur class, a middle-class trading and pro-
fessional class, and a class of workers of varying degrees of skill.
Where the pre-industrial period had laid the property foundations
of capitalist society, the industrial period laid its class foundations.
But perhaps the outstanding achievement of the period was its ful-
fillment of the philosophy of individual initiative and competition as
the organizing principles of economic society. The idea of a tri-
umphant capitalism-the strongest force in American history-
received here its decisive impetus. Despite the intensifying of class
lines, this capitalist myth-and "myth" is used here neutrally to
mean any evocative idea that patterns men's lives--stirred the
energies of rich and poor and created a united front in the interests
of capitalism.39 There was as yet relatively little hostility mani-
fested toward the propertied class by the propertiless: there could
scarcely be hostility toward what every man hoped some day to
attain.40  The whole of American society was turned into an open
state in which capitalist enterprise was given free movement and
bidden Godspeed.
The period of monopoly capitalism, from the eighties to the decade
before the World War, offers to the historian a striking dual visage.
It was marked by a rapid concentration of economic power, but also
by a disenchantment with capitalism.41  The period witnessed not
only the heightening of the movement for industrial consolidation,
but also the building of a credit and banking structure, a technique
of salesmanship and a set of business mores that all attested to the
continuing vitality of capitalism.4 2 But the united front was gone.
In its place was the "independent" entrepreneur confronting the
invincible aggression of the trusts. The competitive ideal, however
neat had been the conception of it as the dominant control in the
39. The concept of the "myth" as used here derives from SORm, REF=LEcTIONS
ON VIOLENCE (1912). Sorel used it of the myth of revolution, but it can be used
of other master-ideas in the history of civilization.
40. 'See HADLEY, UNDERCURRENTS IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1915) lecture II,
"The Constitutional Position of the Property Owner." The common man, says
Hadley, "was not ready to declare war against an industrial society that offered
him so many inducements to become one of its members."
41. For an analysis of this disenchantment, written just before the War by
one of the Progressives, and couched in political rather than economic terms, see
WALTER WEmY, THE N-w DEMOCRACY (1912) c. I.
42. For the classic statement of the outlines of the American business struc-
ture at the end of this period, see VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE: THE CASE or AMERICA (1923).
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economic mechanism, had failed practically in organizing economic
life. The open state was found to be a dangerous program, and some
of the legislatures now began to throw up barricades against its
further extension. Agrarianism, populism, trust-busting, muck-
raking and progressivism grew to alarming strength. They repre-
sented, as we have seen, an inner cleavage in the forces that formerly
had fought side by side in the advance of capitalism.
The final period-that of finance capitalism, covering the last
quarter-century-was marked by a shift of axis in the economic
world from industrial organization to financial control. The growth
of the giant corporation found its significance not so much in the
matter of magnitude as in the separation that it effected between the
ownership and the management of industrial enterprise, and the
opportunity it gave for the subtleties of corporation finance.43 In-
vestment banking became the central activity of the higher reaches
of economic behavior, and such investment houses as that of Morgan,
the symbol of economic power. The attempt to check the mono-
polistic trend came to seem increasingly hopeless, and attention was
transferred to the dangers of financial concentration and banking
cbntrol of industry.4 The capitalist myth, so far from receding,
received an accession of strength from two decades of mounting
prosperity, but its type-figure was now cast not in the image of
the entrepreneur but in that of the speculator or the financial pro-
moter. The bloc that had been formed in the previous period to
stem the growth of the large corporation and the money power found
that their task had become archaic, and that the principal concern
of the community lay in a fair distribution of profits and risks within
the corporate and pecuniary structure. The failure of the old controls
seemed established by the crisis of 1929, and the search for new
controls began along the line of economic planning by the govern-
ment or some form of autonomous rationalization within the busi-
ness structure.45
These successive shifts of focus in American economic reality
have done much to determine the large sweep of American constitu-
tional law. They have done so in a threefold way: by setting the
characteristic problems that have appeared for decision before the
Supreme Court; by creating the conflicts and the clashes of interests
which have given those problems importance for the community;
43. See BERin AND MEANs, op. cit. supra note 33.
44. BRANDEIS, OTHm PEori's MONEY (1914), especially c. IX, "The Failure
of Banker-Management."
45. For the relation of the Supreme Court to the trend of these developments,




and by fashioning the ideologies which have to a large degree in-
fluenced the decisions. Put in another way the impact of American
capitalistic development on the Court has been at once to pose the
problems and to condition the answers.
The increasing push and thrust of economic problems upon the
business of the Supreme Court has been noted by Professors Frank-
furter and Landis.46 Within this larger trend it is interesting to
analyze by what dynamics of the economic process the varied range
of problems are brought into the area of decision. The ordinary
groupings around legal subject matter, or the groupings around
clauses in the Constitution or around devices in the Court procedure
are not entirely revealing. To know that a case is an injunction
case, or that it came under a writ of certiorari, or that it appealed
to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment conveys
little of the context of emotion and belief that might give it meaning.
The groupings might more realistically be built around those clashes
of interests within the economic system or clashes of attitude about
it out of which the cases proceed.
These clashes of interest are as varied of course as the economic
life that they mirror. They are at once evidences of maladjustment
and challenges to control. Some are concerned with the organizational
aspects of capitalism, others with the incidence of its functioning,
still others with the distribution of its flow of income. Thus one may
find clashes of interest between workers and employers over wages
or hours or working conditions or plans for social insurance; between
groups of business-men over trade practises (in the sphere of business
mores) or the maintenance of competition (in the sphere of economic
ideology) ; between consumers and public utility groups over rates and
services; between consumers and other business groups over prices
and standards; between ownership and control groups within the
corporate structure over the division of profits; between agricultural
and industrial groups, Big Business and Little Business groups,
groups being taxed and the government as taxer; between all
sorts of groups who would stand to gain from a particular gov-
ernment policy, such as a grant of direct relief or an issue of legal
tender paper, and those who would stand to lose; 47 between the
46. TnE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREDIE COURT (1927) c. VIII.
47. The clash of interest between debtor and creditor groups is clearly ex-
pressed in the Legal Tender cases, especially in Mr. Justice Bradley's concurring
dissent, 12 Wall. 457, 554, 564 (U. S. 1870) :- "The heart of the nation must not
be crushed out. The people must be aided to pay their debts and meet their obli-
gations. The debtor interest of the country reperesent its bone and sinew, and
must. be encouraged to pursue its avocations. . . But the creditor interest
will lose some of its gold! Is gold the one thing needful? Is it worse for the
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interests of autonomous business control and those of state-enforced
competitive enterprise; between the interests of individual enter-
prise and those of collective control; between those who have a
property interest in the status quo and those who have a humanistic
interest in changing it.
In short, capitalism pushes ultimately before the Court the clashes
of interest that are attendant on the growth of any economic system,
with the displacement in each successive phase of elements that had
been useful in previous phases, with the antagonisms it generates
among those who are bearing its burdens and the rivalry among
those who are dividing its spoils, and with the inherent contradictions
that it may possess. If it be added to this that modern capitalism
is perhaps the least organic system of economic organization the
world has seen--"often, though not always, a mere congeries of
possessors and pursuers," J. Al. Keynes has called it 48-and that
the American social and political structure within which it operates
is perhaps more sprawling and heterogeneous than that of any other
major capitalist society, some notion may be had of the confusion
of interests and purposes out of which it is the task of the Court
to bring certainty and uniformity.
The dimensions of the task must however be qualified in several
respects. Not every case that comes before the Court involves grave
conflicts of interest or broad issues of public policy; it is only the
exceptional cases that do. Moreover the pressures and interests
summarily analyzed above apply to the entire governmental process
in a capitalist state, and not merely to the Court. In fact, the Court
does not fight on the front lines but must be considered a reserve
force. The brunt of the attack and the task of reconciling the con-
flicts is met by the legislatures and the administrative agencies, which
are more amenable to democratic control than is a small tribunal
holding office for life. It is only what survives the legislative barriers
and also the jurisdictional exclusions of the Court,40 that comes finally
to pose its issues. And even of this group not every case involving
an important conflict of interests will exact from the Court that
intense absorption with its social values and implications which
creates the nexus binding the judicial process to the economic system.
Many a case which, if it had come later or earlier in the country's
development might have been decided differently or constituted a
creditor to lose a little by depreciation than everything by the banluptcy of his
debtor"?
48. Quoted in TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RisE OF CAPrIALIS. (1926) at 286.
49. For the substantive importance of many of these procedural exclusions,
see FRANKFURTER AN LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 46; and their annual reviews
of the same subject in the HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
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leading case fails at the time to call into play the entire concentration
of the Court's social philosophy.50 For at any period neither the
Court nor the country can focus its energies on more than a few
dominant issues. It is the area that includes these issues-let us
call it the "area of vital conflict"-that determines the path of
growth in the judicial process and fashions the outlines of con-
stitutional law.
IV
When we turn to the sequence of decision in the history of the
Supreme Court do we find in it any of the movement and stir that
have marked the growth of American capitalism? To most the
question would seem to call for a definite answer in the negative.
There is a tendency, whenever economics and the judicial process
are brought into relation, to regard the first as the active and the
second as the passive element, the first as marking the line of growth
and the second as adjusting itself-or rather, failing to adjust itself
-to that growth.51 There is so much in legal history which seems
to verify this view that our great danger lies in being tempted to
regard it as true. The sociologists have built a theory of the "legal
lag" on the assumption of its validity,52 and much of the "liberal"
criticism of the Court's decisions attributes to that tribunal a dis-
tressing medley of imperviousness and ferocity toward economic
reality. The conception is often extended to include the backward-
ness and inertia of the whole of legal science.
In reality this view embodies only a half-truth, and at present
the more dangerous half. We may guess that it had its origin and
perhaps found its validity in the attempt to bolster the fighting re-
50. It has been noted that the Court in its present composition is likely to be
liberal with regard to cases affecting personal liberties, but conservative with re-
gard to the protection of property rights: see Shulman, The Supreme Coutrt's
Attitude toward Liberty of Contract and Freedom of Speech (1931) 41 YA=E
L. J. 262. An explanation for this might be sought in the fact that issues of
personal liberty are not at present as squarely in the area of vital conflict as are
property issues. In time of war or of war hysteria we should expect that incon-
sistency to be ironed out.
51. For a clear statement of this theme, see HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF'
THE FOREIGN CORPORATION IN AIMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL L4w (1918) at 3-9,
where he speaks of economic change as the "dynamic, element" in constitutional
development, and formal doctrine as the "state element."
52. The entire conception of the legal lag, which owes much to DICmY, LEC-
TURES OF THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DUR-
ING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1905); OGBURN, SOCIAL CHANGE (1923); and
to American sociological jurisprudence; needs to be re-examined more thoroughly
than the limits of this paper will allow.
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formist faith of the Progressive movement by building a somewhat
ramshackle sociology for legal thought. It dates from the period
when a sociological jurisprudence had considerable intellectual ap-
peal, and it seemed to receive confirmation whenever the Court
definitely placed obstacles in the path of social legislation. But it
tends to obscure the important fact that law is as much a growth
as is economics. The principle of growth of a legal doctrine is
undoubtedly not that of an economic technique. It is likely to be
more tortuous and elusive, and to attain its results rather by in-
direction than by a steady processional sequence. But legal doctrines
do have their life histories.5 3 The very fictions they embody are,
by the fact of being fictions, vehicles of change. Instead of positing
an antithesis between a dynamic economic activity and a static law,
it is truer to see the growth of each interwoven with the other and
conditioning the other. Just as the meaning of American con-
stitutional law emerges best from the dynamics of American capi-
talism, so the meaning of capitalism is most securely found in the
developing legal institutions of property, liberty and contract, and
their aggrandizement through the doctrine of due process.
The course of Supreme Court decision when viewed thus falls,
like the course of capitalist development itself, into fairly well defined
periods. It will be well in blocking them out to abstrain from ethical
designations such as "liberal," "conservative" and "reactionary"
which are confusing because of the continual shift of criteria as new
forces and alignments come into play.
The line of judicial growth in the first half century of the court
lay in a pronounced nationalism as expressed in the subordination
of the state legislatures and the protection of vested property rightsr4
Of these the limitation of state power was probably more in the fore-
front of Federalist consciousness than the protection of property, al-
though the two motives were often fused. But it was more than an
article of Federalist faith; it was already a constitutional tradition
holding over from the ideology and temper of the Constitutional Con-
vention. There was a prevailing distrust of anything that the states
might do in a new society, a distrust which was part of that fear of
the people that pursued Federalist thought throughout. State legis-
latures were deemed dangerous because they had yielded basely to the
53. For a general theory of the life history of legal doctrines, see Walton
Hamilton's article on the Judicial Process (1932), 8 ENCYCLOPiEDrA OF THE SocrAL
ScIENCEs 450. See also by the same author, The Arcient Maxim Caveat Emptor
(1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1133; and Affectation with Public Interest (1930) 39 YALE
L. J. 1089.
54. C. G. HAXNES, REVIVAL OF NATUIJEL LAW CONCEPTS (1930) c. IV is espe-
cially full on the growth of judicial doctrine in this early period.
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pressures of the multitude, cutting debts, issuing paper money,
cancelling obligations. To prevent such irresponsibility a line of cases,
of which Fletcher v. Peek 5 and Dartmouth College Trustees v.
Woodward 5 were the most notable, interpreted the "obligations of
contract" clause of the Constitution in a way that has made it of
far-reaching economic importance. The Court evidenced thus at
the very beginning a concern for property that was to grow in
intensity, and incorporated it in a doctrine of vested rights which
Professor Corwin has noted as one of its first doctrinal creations. 1
Of course, it is quite easy to read our own property conflicts into
the phrases of the day, and make an identification where there is
room only for a comparison. Private property was not on the de-
fensive in the America of Marshall as it was to be in the successive
America's of Field, Peckham, Pitney, and Sutherland. It was part
of the rising society and connected with the future of the new
state, and the judicial support of it was an expression of the pre-
vailing ideology. 8 It is noteworthy that on the issue of the desir-
ability of social protection of property rights-as distinct from the
issue of whether the task was a fit one for the judiciary to perform,
and the issue of states rights that was involved-there was little
disagreement between the Federalist and Democratic administrations
before Jackson. Even the early "populist" outbreaks, like Shays'
Rebellion, were not organic revolts against the ominous features of
an economic system as was the Populist movement a century later,
but were part of the revolutionary unsettlement and the post-war
economic impoverishment. And the Jacksonian revolution, with its
extension of the suffrage and its frontier democracy, did not
materially change the constitutional position of property. 0 On the
frontier, as President Hadley has pointed out, property rights had
greater sanction and more immediate protection than human rights.00
One of the striking m~langes of the period, incidentally, is to be
55, 6 Cranch'87 (U. S. 1810Y.
56. 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819).
57. E. S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law (1914)
12 MICH. L. REv. 247, 275. See for a good general treatment of this period, with
an eye to its economic development as well, C. G. HAINES, op. cit. supra note 54,
especially c. IV.
58. HADLEY, op. cit. supra note 40.
59. HADLEY, id. at 27.
60. "The small protection given to the rights of man, as compared with that
which was accorded to the rights of property, is a salient feature in the history
of the early American state-and continues in its later history as well"--RA]
LEY, ibid. He speaks in the same place of the "democratic concern for the in-




found in the manner in which Federalist jurists conscripted the
Jeffersonian ideology of natural law in the service of a doctrine of
vested rights which restricted the powers of Jeffersonian state legis-
latures at the same time that it protected property dear to both parties.
That Marshall's motivation throughout was national unity in the
interests of the smooth functioning of the increasing commercial
activity of the country 61 is shown further in his decision in Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland,6 2 in which Congressional control of monetary
affairs was upheld, and the decisions interpreting the Commerce
Clause,63 especially Gibbons v. Ogden " and Brown v. Maryland.cs
The period of judicial nationalism had coincided roughly with the
pre-industrial period and expressed its ways of thought and life
tolerably well. The second period of the Court's history, extending
from the eighteen thirties to the Civil War reflected to a degree the
coming of industrial capitalism. It was in its juristic ideas a
definitely transitional period, marked by no consistent drive except
a disinclination to place obstacles in the way of the forging of an
industrial society. The relatively tolerant attitude of the Court
toward state legislation in the first two decades of Jacksonian
democracy (1830-1850) was followed in the next decade by a
reaction against the reckless land and currency activities of the
western legislatures. 66 The idea of implied constitutional limitations
on the state power was used as a convenient doctrine; but although
it followed logically from the sanction that natural law gave to
vested rights, and although there was vigorous agitation for it by
Story and Kent and later by Cooley, the Court in this period gave
only a hesitating allegiance to it.7 Its attitude was on the whole
61. BouDIN, op. cit. supra note 3, c. XII, "John Marshall and the Rise of
-Nationalism," speaks of Marshall as being one of the real leaders of the "Young
America" movement, and therefore more closely identified with Madison and
Clay than with the elder statesmen of the Federalist Party. Mr. Boudin also
contends that there is an ideological break in Marshall's career between his ear-
lier and his later opinions, conditioned by this new development. Although Mr.
Boudin intends it to show that Marshall was important despite Marbzry V. Madi-
son, and that he was not the founder of the modern doctrine of Judicial review,
the chief importance of this lead for the present discussion lies in its fortifying
the view that Marshall, like Clay, Webster and the rest of the nationalist group,
was interested in clearing the field for the extension of commerce and industry.
62. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
63. Frankfurter and Freund, Interstate Commerce (1932) 8 ENCYCLORiaIA
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 220, traces incisively the course of interpretation of the
commerce clause in American constitutional law in relation to our economic de-
velopment.
64. 22 U. S. 1 (1824).
65. 25 U. S. 419 (1827).
66. HAINES, op cit. supra note 54, at 97, 98.
67. HAINEs, id. at c. IV.
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pragmatic. Industrialism, with its introduction of a system of
transportation and a marketing area that cut across state boundaries
and shattered the validity of the state-nation concept as a dichotomy,
was bringing problems that could not be solved by a single formula.
In the interpretation of the commerce clause a series of decisions
which, despite the prevalent confusion of purpose, had since Gibbon
v. Ogden clung to a pragmatic insistence on defining state power in
regulating interstate commerce by examining its consequences, was
summed up in Cooley v. Board of Wardens 08 which in effect opened
the way for sustaining state regulation where that would facilitate
the progress of industrialism. 69 The slavery issue was the great
jarring note of emotional absolutism. It was an unavowed participant
in many of the opinions, and by polarizing the emotions of the
country it introduced into the decisions of the Court a more marked
political bias. But the Dred Scott decision may itself be inter-
pretated in terms of the "sweep of economic forces". 0 It marked
a crucial recognition by a land-owning capitalism that the industrial
capitalism that was rising in the northern states was more than a
principle of economic organization but reached to the fabric of the
state, and would have to be combatted with the weapons of con-
stitutional law.
The period of constitutional interpretation that extended from
the end of the Civil War to the middle of the eighties presents as
interesting and challenging a sequence of decision as anj in the
Court's history. Since it measures the transition from a competitive
industrialism to a monopolistic capitalism, it contains the genesis of
many of the problems of regulation that dominate the subsequent
history of the Court. Coming also immediately after the Civil War,
it marks the convergence of a set of attitudes relating to business
enterprise with a set of attitudes relating to Reconstruction-to the
confusion of both. Thus in the early part of the period, while the
Reconstruction issue was still fresh, the economic influences which
would otherwise have helped shape the course of judicial decision
are qualified and confused; and in the latter part, when the economic
ideologies reassert themselves, a constitutional amendment intended
primarily as a guide for the problem of reconstruction is increasingly
pressed into service to bolster a theory of economic statesmanship.
Not only do the cases smell of powder but often of the powder of
two different battles.
68. 53 U. S. 299 (1851).
69. Frankfurter and Freund, supra note 63, at 222.
70. The phrase is from CHARLES AND MARY BEARD, op. cit, upra note 38.
Chapter XVII contains a good account of the economic and emotional setting of
the Dred Scott decision.
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The Fourteenth Amendment, which has laid its hand so heavily
upon American constitutional law, seems to have come into being
with less attendant innocence than had until recently been believed.
Professor Kendrick's edition of the Journal of the committee 71 which
prepared the amendment indicates that the notion of using a negro
rights amendment to restrict state legislative raids upon business
interests was not wholly absent from the minds of the members. It
did not receive definite expression before the Court, however, until
Roscoe Conlding's argument in the Sau Mateo case. 2  But even
clearer was the intent on the part of the Radical Republicans to use
the amendment as an entering wedge to effect a complete constitu-
tional subordination of the states to the nation, not so much in the
interests of property as in the interests of northern control. 73 The
first test of the amendment in the Slaughterhouse case 74 was there-
fore not a clear-cut decision on the economic issue of regulation that
was involved but was oriented toward the political issue, which was
more directly in the area of vital conffict of the day. But the most
important parts of the decision are the brief of ex-Justice Campbell
and Justice Field's dissenting opinion 75 that was based on it. Camp-
bell's line of reasoning, by which the due process clause could be
interpreted to support property rights against legislative restriction,
was subsequently hammered away at the Court in a series of powerful
dissenting opinions by Field 76 and his supporters until their triumph
in Allgeyer v. Loisina.7 Whatever the orientation of the majority
in the case, the Field orientation was economic. It is as if he had
a prevision of the future needs of capitalist enterprise and how
those needs would be supplied. The second and more crucial test
of the Fourteenth Amendment, in Munn v. fllinois,718 was, because
of its setting in the Granger revolt 79 rather than the Reconstruction
71. B. B. KENDRicK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT Co0,uvrn or FIFrE on
RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CoNGRESS, 1865-1867 (1914).
72. County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 116 U. S. 138 (1885).
For a discussion of this case, see KENDRICK, op. cit. supra note 71, at 28-36.
73. KENDRiCK, id. at c. VII, VIII.
74. Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall, 36 (U. S. 1872).
75. Id. at 83.
76. Walter Nelles' review of SWIsHER, STEPHEN J. FIEL (1930) in (1931),
40 YALE L. J. 998, is a remarkable analysis of the relation between Field's opin-
ions and the forces active in the developing society in which he lived. An ade-
quate treatment of the relation between the Supreme Court and American capi-
talism must wait upon the publication of such other analytic studies of the other
Supreme Court justices.
77. 165 U. S. 578 (1897).
78. 94 U. S. 113 (1876); also the Granger cases, 94 U. S. 155 (1876).
79. See SOLON J. BucK, THE GRANGER MOVEMET (1913), and THE AcmA-
RIAN CRUSADE (1920) ; also HACKNER AND KENDRICK, op. cit. szipra note 10, part L
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issue, fought on new ground. The incidence of the monopolistic
trends upon the farmers, whose position in a capitalist society is at
best anachronistic, had led to the passage of regulatory state legis-
lation. The reaction of the business community to the Waite opinion,
with its attitude of judicial toleration of the state acts, and Justice
Field's dissent as the expression of that reaction, marked the be-
ginning of a grand peur which seized the property interests and
scarcely abated for several decades until they had arrived within
the secure confines of Allgeyer v. Louisiana and Lochner v. Now
York.80 It was scarcely a coincidence that this epidemic of fear
coincided with the publication of Cooley's Constitutional Limit-
ations.8 ' But the most significant phase of the campaign for a new
conception of due process lay in the steady insistence of the counsel
for the corporations that the justices owed a duty to the society they
lived in to conserve its most sacred institution even in the face of
the strict constitutional logic of the situation. 2 This was the first
important manifestation of the social animus of the new corporation
lawyers and of the effects of their association with the ideology of
business,
This period in the Court's history from the Civil War to the first
victory of the Field cohorts in the mid-eighties was thus one of the
fateful periods in our national life. It marked a parting of the ways
between a policy of judicial tolerance and one of the further extension
of judicial review. The Court stood poised between the agrarian
revolt, which had been stirred by the growth of monopolist capital-
80. 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
81. HAIN, op. cit. supra, note 54, at 122; see also William Seagle, "Thomas
M. Cooley" (1931), 4 ENCYCLOPJEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 356.
82. A rather remarkable example is contained in Choate's argument in Pol-
lock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 532, 534, 553 (1895). "I
believe that there are rights of property here to be protected; that we have a
right to come to this court and ask for this protection, and that this court has a
right, without asking leave of the Attorney General or of any counsel, to hear
our plea. The act of Congress we are impugning before you is communistic in its
purposes and tendencies, and is defended here upon principles as communistic,
socialistic-what shall I call them-populistic as ever have been addressed to any
political assembly in the world. . . I have thought that one of the funda-
mental objects of all civilized government was the preservation of the rights of
private property. I have thought that it was the very keystone of the arch upon
which all civilized government rests. . . If it be true . . . that the pas-
sions of the people are aroused on this subject, if it be true that a mighty army
of sixty million citizens is likely to be incensed by this decision, it is the more
vital to the future welfare of this country that this court again resolutely and
courageously declare, as Marshall did, that it has the power to set aside an act
of Congress violative of the Constitution, and that it will not hesitate in execut-
ing that power, no matter what the threatened consequences of popular or popu-
listie wealth may be."
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ism, and the business interests whose new militancy concealed their
uneasiness. We know of course which policy eventually prevailed
and what a difference that has made in our national life. It is
relatively easy from the vantage ground of the present to say that
a real choice never existed, and that the development of monopoly
capitalism made the outcome for the Supreme Court an inevitable
one. But inevitability is a summary word that solves too many
difficulties. Capitalist development certainly weighted the scales.
It set the wider limits outside of which no choice was possible. But
within those limits the country had a chance at a choice-and took it.
The doctrine which came to the fore in the mid-eighties and
dominated the court for a quarter century was on the economic side
a militant expression of laissez-faire and on the legal side a no less
militant extension of the economic scope of due process. It seems at
first sight surprising that a period which was seeing the individual-
istic ideal of competition gave way to monopoly should call for a
laissez-faire policy in its Court decisions. But laissez-faire is to be
distinguished from individualism; the latter is a philosophy, the
former a mandate.8 3 Laissez-faire may conceivably proceed from
a cherishing of individualist values, but since it would in such an
event have to qualify its imperative claims for freedom from
legislative interference by a recognition of the individualist values
which are injured by such freedom, its relations are likely to be
solely empirical. The change from the individualism at the basis
of the previous period of judicial toleration to the laissez-faire-ism
of the new restrictive period measured the difference between the
two intellectual climates. There was of course a new alignment in
the Court; the old minority had become a majority. But it was a
new Court in a new society. It was not a sport, but an organic part
of a period which has come down in the history of American life as
thin in its cultural fibre and crass in its political morality. One
may hazard that much of the responsibility is to be laid to the dis-
illusioning effect of the competitive breakdown under the pressure
of new and unscrupulous business mores.
The period of judicial toleration had, we have noted, been a crucial
period, hesitant and divided when confronted by bewildering prob-
lems of a new industrialism. The period of judicial restriction was,
when confronted by a dangerous revolt against the incidence of the
new forms of capitalist enterprise,84 decisive and militant. And it
83. For the connection between the program of laisscz-faire in the American
situation, and the theory of natural rights of which it makes use, see VEBLnu,
THE VESTED INTERESTS AND TIM COI ON MAN (1920).
84. Not least among the causes for the militancy of the possessing classes, re-
flected in the militancy of the Court, was the influx of immigration and the
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was in its own way remarkably creative. On every important front
of public policy it transformed the existing dictrine with consider-
able ingenuity 85 -in the field of railroad regulation (Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pacific Rr.; IM Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul
v. Minnesota; 87 Smythe 'v. Ames),88 business control (Allgeyer v.
Louisiana), federal taxation (Pollock, v. Farmers Loan and Trust),89
regulation of hours (Lochner v. New York), social legislation (Erm-
ployers' Liability Cases),00 and anti-trust cases (United States V.
E. C. Knight Company).91 It was in this period that the powerful
conceptions of contemporary constitutional law-due process, 2 police
powers,93 liberty of contract 94 and the rule of reasonableness 96-
received their real impetus and elaboration.
growth of a labor movement which, while in the main a "business unionism"
variety, was often engaged in violent clashes with employers. The fear of the
immigrant worker, and the contempt for him, have been influential in American
history not only in heightening the clash between capitalists and laborers, but
in putting behind the former a united body of opinion representing middle class
respectability. The Court in its decisions in this period reflected the prevalent
Catonian attitude toward the labor movement, which called for its extirpation.
I Co aMoNs, op. cit. supra note 35, at 9, points out however that the courts by
blocking labor's way toward reform probably made the trade union movement
even more aggressive.
85. The sequence of steps by which the Fourteenth Amendment was pressed
into use for the protection of business interests against legislative regulation
seems to have been somewhat as follows: 1) The decision that corporations are
"persons" within the meaning of the Amendment; 2) the decision that equal pro-
tection of the laws applies to foreign corporations as well as to individuals from
outside states; 3) the decision that the due process clause applies to legislative
and administrative attempts to regulate rates and other matters connected with
the conduct of business enterprise; 4) the decision that liberty of contract is a
right of liberty (or of property) within the meaning of the Amendment; 5) the
decision that the police power and the public interest doctrine must be narrowly
and urgently construed in determining exemption from the due process clause;
6) the decision that the reasonableness of state legislation is not a matter of
presumption by the fact that the legislation passed the gauntlet of the legislative
process, but is open to examination by the Court.
86. 118 U. S. 394 (1886).
87. 134 U. S. 418 (1890).
88. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
89. 157 U. S. 429 (1895).
90. 207 U. S. 463 (1908).
91. 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
92. See HAINEs, op. cit. supra note 54, at c. VI; Hough, Due Process of Law-
Today (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 218.
93. See FREUND, POLICE PowER, PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIOtXT5
(1904).
94. See Walton Hamilton, Freedom of Contract (1931) 6 ENCYCLOPAMDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 450; Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract (1909) 18 YAL
L. J. 454; Shulman, op. cit. supra note 50.
95. See BOUDIN, op. cit. supra note 3; HAINES, op. cit. supra note 54, at c. VII.
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In the last quarter century the trend of judicial decision has again
become vacillating for lack of some decisive movement within
capitalist enterprise itself to give it firmness and direction. The
second decade of the century is generally considered to have been
"liberal," and Muller v. Oregon 91 was hailed as a significant turning-
point; the third decade is regarded as a "reactionary" return to
normalcy; during the last several years liberals with their ears to
the ground have again detected pulsations of hope. A closer analysis,
however, of these three phases of the period fails to reveal any
strildng contrasts.97 'Nor do they show a unified line of growth. At
the basis of their failure to achieve direction lies the character of
the finance-capitalist society in which they have been working. Its
pace of change in the field of both corporate and human relations
has been too rapid to leave the earlier legal rules untouched, but too
insecure to furnish a means of transforming them. It has ceased
to be merely a monopoly capitalism, but it has not yet articulated
a technique to control its new creatures, the giant corporation and
the expanding credit structure. It has outgrown its complete im-
perviousness to the plight of the underlying classes, but has not
yet found a way of meeting either their demands or their require-
ments. The old individualistic controls are clearly a thing of the
past: to cling to them would involve drastic results for the entire
economic structure. But pending a discovery of controls that will
replace them the Court has waited for a crystallization of capitalist
attitudes.9 8 The tentativeness of this period has of course furnished
the able and decisive minority group with a golden opportunity to
influence the trend of decision. But a minority can work only in-
terstitially, 9 and never against the grain of current economic de-
velopment. Whether capitalist enterprise can crystallize its new
purposes and perfect its techniques sufficiently to give the Court
again a clear faith and an articulated ideology remains to be seen.
96. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
97. For such an analysis, see BouDIN, op. cit. suprm note 54, at c. XXXVIII,
XXXIX. The basis of Boudin's skepticism is partly the failure of the decisions to
evidence any intention on the part of the Court to declare any self-denying ordi-
nances, with regard to the judicial power; partly that even in the "liberal" deci-
sions, the Court-as regards the larger trends of the rule of reasonableness, or
any rule for future cases-was timid and even reactionary.
98. The critics of the Court have in one respect uniformly done it an injus-
tice. They have not recognized sufficiently the tremendous task that devolves
upon the Court-once it is agreed that legislation is to be scrutinized at all-to
make the legislation harmonize with the fundamental purposes of a capitalist
economy. For these purposes are not always clear, even to industrialists and
bankers. And in the confusion of council that characterizes present trends with-
in business, the task of the Supreme Court is all the more difficult.




The nexus between the course of Supreme Court decision and the
realities of American capitalism '0 poses some crucial problems as
to the nature of the judicial process. It is upon this broader question
that all our current theoretical interests in American constitutional
law converge, for it is here that one approaches the dynamics of
growth in the law. Contemporary American thought on this question
is in the transitional stage attendant upon having shattered the old
absolutes without having yet arrived at new formulations. It has
rejected the rhetoric and the traditional mumbo-jumboism with
which the reverent generations had invested the fundamental law.
It finds it no longer possible to regard the judicial utterances as
Delphic, 10 1 and takes an almost irreverent delight in uncovering the
bonds that link Supreme Court justices to other human beings. The
myths have fallen away. But the absence of myths does not con-
stitute theory; it is at best merely preparation for it.
It will be well to distinguish two aspects of contemporary thought
on the Supreme Court and its economic relations. One has to do
with the function that the Court decisions perform, the other with
the forces determining them. The prevailing view of the function
of the Court is thoroughly realistic. It sees the Court as a definite
participant in the formation of public policy, often on matters of
far-reaching economic and social importance. Viewed thus the Court
through its power to veto legislation has also the power to channel
economic activity. In that sense it has been often called a super-
legislature, exercising powers tantamount to the legislative power,
but more dangerously since it is not subject to the same popular
control. The main contention here is sound, although the particular
formulation it is given is often overstressed. Whether we shall call
the Court a super-legislature or a super-judiciary has in reality only
a propagandist relevance. Except from the standpoint of a separ-
ation-of-powers ideal or a shattering of intellectual myths it is of
little import. But what is of great import is the fact that the Court
has become, through its exercise of the judicial power in the intri-
cate context of contemporary capitalist society, a crucial agency of
social control. As such it is part of our fabric of statesmanship
100. This brings us back to the problem of the legal lag touched on supra.
As a matter of fact, it might be said-if it were not so paradoxical-that there
is less lag in the conservative decisions than in the liberal criticism of them-lag,
that is, with regard to economic reality, and not with regard to enlightened opin-
ion. It is often difficult for liberal minds to understand that the reality does not
necessarily conform to their view of it.
101. For the "discovery theory" of law, see Corwin, The "Highcr Law" Back.
ground of American Constitutional Law (1928) 42 HARv. L. REv. 149, 153.
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and should be judged in terms of its incidence upon American life.
The second aspect of the problem relates to an adequate theory
of judicial decision. The contemporary trend is to regard each
judge as acting upon his own economic beliefs and his own prefer-
ences as to social policy, and as rationalizing or deliberately mani-
pulating his legal views into conformity with his social views. This
represents of course an extreme revulsion against the traditional
view of the judge as objectively expounding a body of law that has
some superior truth-sanction. It looks toward a complete and perhaps
unfruitful atomism: tel juge, tel jugement. It would hold that the
course of judicial decision is the sum of the personal choices of the
judges, and that the policy of the Court is determined at any time
by the chance concatenation of nine arbitrary wills. Side by side
with this there is another trend toward a sort of environmentalism
or economic determinism. While holding to the atomistic view of
the judicial process, it emphasizes in each judge not the volitional
and whimsical elements but the non-volitional and determined. It
examines his early life, education, economic affiliations and property
interests, and by a selective process with which every biographer is
acquainted it shows the inevitable flow of what he is from what he
has been. Both these approaches stress the compelling reality of
the judge's views of social policy as over against his adherance to
legal rules in determining his decision; in this respect they mark
a change from the tendency a decade or more ago to make the
antithesis one between logic and experience, between a mechanical
adherance to stare decisis and a realistic awareness of the changing
needs of the day.
Such a theory of the judicial process obviously contains much
that is sound and fruitful along with elements that tend to be merely
impressionistic. Its atomism derives probably from influences
similar to those which led Justice Cardozo to focus his analysis of
the Nature of the Judicial Process on the individual judge and the
individual decision. Cardozo's discussion of the various intellectual
procedures open to the judge comes dangerously close to a new
Benthamism by which the isolated judge balances the compulsions
of logic against the claims of philosophy and both against the per-
suasions of sociology. By a similar Benthamism in the current
atomistic view the judge is made a lightning calculator not of com-
peting intellectual methods but of his own desires and devices. Both
views are helpful through their insistence that whatever influences
the judicial decision must pass through the mind of the judge. But
they do not take sufficient account of the fact that his mind is itself
largely a social product, and that he is a judge within an economic
system and an ideological milieu. Their influence is operative even
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when he is not applying the "method of sociology," or using law
consciously as an instrument for social ends.
For the problem of the relation of capitalism to the Supreme
Court the construction of a theory of judicial decision is of crucial
importance. If the historical analysis presented in the last two
sections is valid, much in the development of American constitutional
law is explainable in terms of a developing capitalism. Such an
influence, to be effective, would have had to be operative homehow
on the minds of the judges, through whom alone constitutional law
grows. But how? In what form and through what agencies have
the effects of economic development been transmitted to the minds
of the judges? The easiest answer of course would lie in a theory
of pressures. But while this might be valid for some of the lower
reaches of the American judiciary, it has no meaning at all for
these men, who are placed by their exalted and permanent positions
beyond the reach of corruption, as they are placed also beyond that
of democratic control. A theory of interests is likely to be more
valid. The judge is a member of an economic class, of a social
grouping, of a geographical section. He shares their interests and
will, even if unconsciously, direct his policy-forming function to
their advantage. But unless this theory is broadened to include
general ideological influences as well as direct interests, it will suffer
from the oversimplified and mechanical interpretation that has been
applied to the framing of the Constitution.
An adequate theory of the judicial process in the Supreme Court
would have to take account of a number of factors. (1) The Court
works first of all with a set of traditional and technical legal ele-
ments. It must stay within the framework of a Constitution, confine
itself to the facts and issues of actual cases brought before it, observe
and create for itself a body of procedure. It must maintain so much
continuity with its own past decisions as to achieve the necessary
minimum of legal certainty, and so much consistency with its own
past reasoning as to make the body of constitutional law a somewhat
orderly intellectual system. In the process it creates concepts and
develops doctrines, such as due process, liberty of contract and
police power, giving them thereby a directive force over 'its future
decisions. There has been a tendency in recent thought to treat all
these legal factors in the judicial process less as rules than as
techniques-fairly flexible and accordingly subservient to the more
deeply rooted purposes of the judges. (2) The Court works within
a cultural and institutional framework which the justices share
with their fellow citizens. They live in and are sworn to preserve
a society which is the end-product of a historical growth but is also
changing under their very fingers. This society is dominated by
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its capitalist system of economic organization and is therefore best
viewed as a capitalist society. Its institutions and modes of thought
are partly incorporated in the Constitution, partly in the body of
constitutional law, but are mainly resident in the life of the society
itself. (3) The Court works in a world of ideas which the justices
share with their fellow-men. These ideological elements--concep-
tions of human nature, human motive, social possibility and ethical
values-may be "preconceptions" and therefore submerged in con-
sciousness, or they may be avowedly held and deliberately applied.
Many of them, such as the competitive ideal and the right of property,
proceed from the economic world, those that do not, such as human
nature, individualism and natural law, have nevertheless a definite
bearing on economic problems; all of them are social products and
are affected by changes in the social and economic structure. (4)
There are personal and intellectual differences between the judges
-- differences of background, philosophy, social convictions and sym-
pathies.
Of these factors the second and third groups-the world of social
fact and the world of social idea-include and are conditioned by
the nature of our economic life. The selection that any particular
judge makes of them will constitute what Thomas Reed Powell has
called the "logic" of his decision; the selection that he makes of the
first group of factors-the legal tradition and technology-will
constitute the "rhetoric" by which he supports and rationalizes his
decision. 10 2 For an explanation of the main trend of constitutional
decision we may therefore look to the institutional and ideological
elements 103 that exercise their compulsive force on the minds of the
judges,10 4 and to the changes wrought in these elements principally
102. See T. R. Powell, The Logic and Rhctoric of Costitutional Laio (1918)
15 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIC MrETOD 645. This
essay was one of the most important in shifting American juristic thought. The
accepted theory of the judicial process had been that the judge was like the oracle
of Jupiter at Dodona who, upon being presented with the problem that called for
decision, stupefied himself with vapors and listened to the dim voices that came
to him: or, in other words, that the judge brought to bear ancient lights to Miu-
mine modern instances. Professor Powell's emphasis was that the judge brought
to bear his current outlook to manipulate the ancient rules.
103. In constructing an explanation of how those ideological influences oper-
ate on the minds of the judges, we shall have to remember that the judges are
in this respect no different from ordinary men. The formation of opinion through
the operation of "stereotypes," elaborated by Graham Wallas, and also by W AL-
Tm LIPPIuAN, PUBLIc OPINION (1930) would apply here also.
104. Perhaps nowhere has this truth been more forcefully stated than in
Justice Peckham's remarks about Lord Hale, in connection with Hale's state-
ment of the "public interest" doctrine. . . "his views as to the policy and
propriety of laws involving an interference with the private concerns of the sub-
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by economic development. For an explanation of the groupings
within the Court, we may look to the variations in outlook and belief
as between the individual members.
This raises a question about the Court which is as important for
social action as for juristic theory. What technique can be em-
ployed for shifting and controlling the trend of the Court's decisions?
What are the chances, for example, that the Court will reverse the
secular trend of its decisions during the past half century and adopt
an attitude toward private property that will tolerate experiments
in the direction of a controlled and articulated economy? The con-
temporary emphasis on the judge's capacity to make his rhetoric
march to the tune of his social beliefs has as corollary the view that
the crucial concern, whether of liberals or conservatives, should be
the selection of the right judges-a sort of eugenics program for
the judicial process. It seems clear, however, that such a view is
over optimistic. It stops at the judge and does not push its analysis
to what it is that determines his view of life. The judge's convictions
and social preferences run in terms of the current ideologies of his
day; through those ideologies the operative economic forces and
master trends of the period find their way into the Court's decisions.
In such a sense it has been said that a period deserves whatever
Supreme Court it gets-because it has created the judges in its own
ideological 'image. A period in which capitalist enterprise is on
the aggressive and the individualistic ideal sweeps everything before
it is not likely to read anything but an individualistic philosophy into
its constitutional law. A period like the present in which the in-
dividualistic ideal has been undermined by worldwide economic
collapse is likely to be increasingly tolerant of departures from an
absolute conception of liberty or property.10IThis does not involve, however, a rigorous determinism, either
economic or ideological. The judicial process is not, as a too
mechanical view might hold, powerless in the clutch of capitalist
circumstance. The current institutions and ways of thought of a
ject were, of course, colored by the general ideas as to the proper function of
government then existing. This great magistrate, it will be remembered, was a
firm believer in the existence of witchcraft, and presided at the trials of old
women accused of such crime, and condemned them to death on conviction there-
of. I do not mention this as any evidence against the ability, integrity or learn-
ing of this upright man and able lawyer; but it is entirely conclusive of the truth
of the statement that all men, however great and however honest, are almost
necessarily affected by the general belief of their times, and that Lord Hale was
not one of the few exceptions to this rule." People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1, 46 ot
seq., 22 N. E. 670, 682 (1889).
105. This is how I understand also E. S. Corwin's delightful Presidential ad-
dress before the American Political Science Association, op. cit. supra note 45.
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period determine only the larger outlines which the constitutional
law of the period is likely to take. Within that framework there is
room for a fairly wide selection and variation of emphasis. The
Supreme Court effects a nexus between our fundamental law and
our fundamental economic institutions. But by its very position as
an agency of control it is powerful to change the contours of those
institutions. The same constitutional fabric that contains the absolute
individualism of Justice Sutherland gives scope also to the human-
istic individualism of Justice Holmes, and the social constructivism
of Justice Brandeis. The judicial process in the Supreme Court is
no exception to the order of things everywhere. Within the limits
set by its nature and function it can be carried on with creativeness
and purpose or it can become merely a form of submission to the
current drift.
